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NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Peter Brown
1 This work takes an innovative and yet balanced look at the major tendencies of Chinese
foreign and security policy over the course of the past quarter-century. Beyond the
leadership changes begun in 2002 at the time of the Sixteenth Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), and the never-ending passing of the flame from Jiang Zemin to
Hu Jintao, the formulation of such policy is guided by rules that are partly traditional
and  partly  new,  attesting  both  to  a  greater  complexity  in  the  decision-making
mechanisms  and  to  a  process  of  learning-adaptation  being  undergone  by  China  in
international affairs. 
2 In his preliminary chapter, David Lampton identifies the four dominant tendencies that
are  indisputable.  These  are  professionalisation,  corporate  pluralisation,
decentralisation  and  globalisation.  The  first,  the  professionalisation  of  those
participating in the discussion-making process, is itself more broadly influenced by the
input of experts,  as shown in Lu Ning’s chapter. Corporate or institutional—but not
institutionalised—pluralisation is marked by a greater public awareness of conflicts of
interest between the main bureaucracies participating in the formulation of foreign
and  security  policy  (Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Ministry  of  Foreign  Trade  and
Economic Relations, Central Military Board, etc.) as well as by a greater influence of
David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in ...
China Perspectives, 52 | march-april 2004
1
what passes for public opinion in this area. The decentralisation of China’s external
actions, as attested by the international dynamism of the Chinese provinces and major
cities,  has further enhanced the ever-growing influence of local bodies on a certain
number of foreign policy decisions—in particular in the economic and cultural spheres
and border-related issues (see the contributions by Peter  Cheung and James Tang).
Finally, there is the obvious impact of globalisation on the attitude adopted by Peking
in a certain number of areas, such as arms control or the World Trade Organisation
(WTO).
3 The work is dedicated to the memory of Arthur Doak Barnett, who played a pioneering
role in this type of discussion. It clearly brings out the gains made by research since the
early 1980s, and the accumulation of knowledge about the mechanisms involved in the
making of China’s international decisions1. The book also draws a certain number of
lessons from its many contributions on the relations between domestic and foreign
policy,  as  well  as  on  the  process  underway  of  this  country’s  integration  into  the
international community. 
4 The conclusions reached by the editor as by most of  the contributors are perfectly
clear: Chinese foreign policy, determined as it is by domestic priorities—in particular
economic development and social stability—as well as by a concern to establish the
international image of a state that has respect for international law, still defends what
the leadership of the CCP considers to be the national interest. 
5 Peking thus gives its backing first and foremost to international regimes that are not
directly  at  odds  with  its  own  interests.  In  this  respect,  the  chapter  by  Elizabeth
Economy shows perfectly well why China has chosen to adopt an attitude that is, to say
the least, uncooperative in terms of environmental protection, particularly with regard
to the Montreal Treaty on substances reducing the ozone layer, which it ratified in
1991, and the framework convention on climate change that it signed in 1992. However,
by dint of its various international commitments and also pressure from the United
States, a country that it needs for its development, China embarked on what appears to
be a “tactical” course of change in some areas that gradually became a “strategic” one
on account of the growing cost of any backward retreat. Bates Gill’s contribution to the
development  of  Chinese  policy  in  terms  of  the  non-proliferation  and  control  of
weapons illustrates the reality of this slippery slope, as shown, for example, by Peking’s
signing in 1996 of the Total Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 
6 Many would no doubt be tempted to extend this conclusion to China’s entry into the
WTO. As Margaret Pearson points out in her chapter on the negotiations leading to this
membership,  the  learning process  has  not  been easy;  nor  has  it  received universal
assent. We now know, for instance, that this process has in no way prevented multiple
attempts  of  resistance  —at  both  central  and  local  level—  to  the  commitments
undertaken in 2001.
7 The most striking impression one has in reading this work is the central government’s
ability  to maintain  fundamental  control  over  the  major  directions  of  foreign  and
security policy. This remains true for as vital a question as that of Taiwan, as Michael
Swaine shows in a very detailed way. It also holds for the centre’s capacity to manage,
and even to manipulate, public opinion. In this connection, we could not recommend
too  highly  the  chapter  by  Joseph  Fewsmith  and  Stanley  Rosen.  They  distinguish
between three types of public opinion, which are admittedly open to debate. These are
the  elite,  that  is  to  say  the  CCP’s  leadership;  the  sub-elite,  the  intellectuals  and
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researchers; and the people. In the process, these writers show how much these various
groups can influence,  to  different  degrees,  the  decision-makers  in  their  conduct  of
foreign policy, yet without having succeeded, at least for the time being, in diverting
them from their primary objectives.
8 To take this analysis a step further, let us venture to suggest that the administration’s
ability to manage or manipulate opinion should be set in relation to the discourse of
both  the  official  propaganda  and  the  school  textbooks  on  international  affairs.
Accordingly, at the time of the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999,
Chinese  public  opinion  had  for  several  weeks  been  “conditioned”  by  the  media
hammering  out  a  pro-Serbian  (and  pro-Milosevic)  and  anti-NATO  propaganda.
Similarly, the negative image of post-war Japan probably goes back originally to school
textbooks  and  a  certain  press  obsessively  recalling  the  Nanking  massacre  or,
erroneously but persistently, Tokyo’s refusal to apologise for its past crimes. One could
add that the popular condemnation on the mainland of the ambition of the Taiwanese
authorities to return the Republic of China to the international community is in large
part  to  be  explained by  propaganda.  Ever  since  1949,  this  propaganda has  made  a
dogma of the disappearance of the nationalist regime that year, despite the latter’s
evident survival on the island of Formosa. 
9 Propaganda does, however, have its limits, and in China, school textbooks that continue
to make South Korea responsible for the war launched by Kim Il-Sung in June 1950 can
cohabit with a Korean policy favouring Seoul over Pyongyang whose overall aim is to
attract the latter into its sphere of influence. The contribution by Samuel Kim, showing
the specific nature and complexity of Peking’s interests on the peninsula, should be
read by anyone following the difficult multilateral negotiations being conducted on the
North Korean nuclear question. 
10 In short, this is a splendid work to which our short account can hardly do justice. In
particular,  it  opens  up  many  new  avenues  for  research  into  the  way  the  Chinese
political system, its functioning and interaction with the rest of the world are presently
evolving. 
NOTES
1. See Arthur Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China, London, I.B. Tauris,
1985, 160 p.
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